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ntp_auth(5) ntp_auth(5)
NAME
ntp_auth - Authentication Options
INTRODUCTION
This page describes the various cryptographic authentication provisions in NTPv4. Details about the configuration com-
mands and options are given on the Configuration Options page. Details about the automatic server discovery schemes are
described on the Automatic Server Discovery Schemes page. Additional information is available in the papers, reports,
memoranda and briefings cited on the NTP Project page. Authentication support allows the NTP client to verify that
servers are in fact known and trusted and not intruders intending accidentally or intentionally to masquerade as a legit-
imate server.
The NTPv3 specification RFC-1305 defines a scheme properly described as symmetric key cryptography. It uses the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm operating in cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode. Subsequently, this scheme was replaced
by the RSA Message Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm commonly called keyed-MD5. Either algorithm computes a message digest or one-
way hash which can be used to verify the client has the same key and key identifier as the server. If the OpenSSL crypto-
graphic library is installed, support is available for all algorithms included in the library. Note however, if confor-
mance to FIPS 140-2 is required, only a limited subset of these algorithms is available.
NTPv4 includes the NTPv3 scheme and optionally a new scheme based on public key cryptography and called Autokey. Public
key cryptography is generally considered more secure than symmetric key cryptography, since the security is based on pri-
vate and public values which are generated by each participant and where the private value is never revealed. Autokey
uses X.509 public certificates, which can be produced by commercial services, utility programs in the OpenSSL software
library or the ntp-keygen utility program in the NTP software distribution.
While the algorithms for MD5 symmetric key cryptography are included in the NTPv4 software distribution, modern algo-
rithms for symmetric key and public key cryptograpny requires the OpenSSL software library to be installed before build-
ing the NTP distribution. This library is available from http://www.openssl.org and can be installed using the procedures
outlined in the Building and Installing the Distribution page. Once installed, the configure and build process automati-
cally detects the library and links the library routines required.
Note that according to US law, NTP binaries including OpenSSL library components, including the OpenSSL library itself,
cannot be exported outside the US without license from the US Department of Commerce. Builders outside the US are advised
to obtain the OpenSSL library directly from OpenSSL, which is outside the US, and build outside the US.
Authentication is configured separately for each association using the key or autokey option of the server configuration
command, as described in the Server Options page, and the options described on this page. The ntp-keygen page describes
the files required for the various authentication schemes. Further details are in the briefings, papers and reports at
the NTP project page linked from www.ntp.org.
SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
The original RFC-1305 specification allows any one of possibly 65,534 keys (excluding zero), each distinguished by a
32-bit key ID, to authenticate an association. The servers and clients involved must agree on the key, key ID and key
type to authenticate NTP packets. If an NTP packet includes a message authentication code (MAC), consisting of a key ID
and message digest, it is accepted only if the key ID matches a trusted key and the message digest is verified with this
key. Note that for historic reasons the message digest algorithm is not consistent with RFC-1828. The digest is computed
directly from the concatenation of the key string followed by the packet contents with the exception of the MAC itself.
Keys and related information are specified in a keys file, usually called ntp.keys, which must be distributed and stored
using secure means beyond the scope of the NTP protocol itself. Besides the keys used for ordinary NTP associations,
additional keys can be used as passwords for the ntpq and ntpdc utility programs. Ordinarily, the ntp.keys file is gener-
ated by the ntp-keygen program, but it can be constructed and edited using an ordinary text editor. The program generates
pseudo-random keys, one key for each line. Each line consists of three fields, the key identifier as a decimal number
from 1 to 65534 inclusive, a key type chosen from the keywords of the digest option of the crypto command, and a 20-char-
acter printable ASCII string or a 40-character hex string as the key itself.
When ntpd is first started, it reads the key file specified by the keys command and installs the keys in the key cache.
However, individual keys must be activated with the trustedkey configuration command before use. This allows, for
instance, the installation of possibly several batches of keys and then activating a key remotely using ntpdc. The
requestkey command selects the key ID used as the password for the ntpdc utility, while the controlkey command selects
the key ID used as the password for the ntpq utility.
By default, the message digest algorithm is MD5 selected by the key type M in the keys file. However, if the OpenSSL
library is installed, any message digest algorithm supported by that library can be used. The key type is selected as the
algorithm name given in the OpenSSL documentation. The key type is associated with the key and can be different for dif-
ferent keys. The server and client must share the same key, key ID and key type and both must be trusted. Note that if
conformance to FIPS 140-2 is required, the message digest algorithm must conform to the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), which
requires an algorithm from the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family, and the digital signature encryption algorithm, if
used, must conform to the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), which requires the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
In addition to the above means, ntpd now supports Microsoft Windows MS-SNTP authentication using Active Directory ser-
vices. This support was contributed by the Samba Team and is still in development. It is enabled using the mssntp flag of
the restrict command described on the Access Control Options page. Note: Potential users should be aware that these ser-
vices involve a TCP connection to another process that could potentially block, denying services to other users. There-
fore, this flag should be used only for a dedicated server with no clients other than MS-SNTP.
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
NTPv4 supports the Autokey security protocol, which is based on public key cryptography. The Autokey Version 2 protocol
described on the Autokey Protocol page verifies packet integrity using MD5 message digests and verifies the source using
digital signatures and any of several digest/signature schemes. Optional identity schemes described on the Autokey Iden-
tity Schemes page are based on cryptographic challenge/response exchanges. These schemes provide strong security against
replay with or without message modification, spoofing, masquerade and most forms of clogging attacks. These schemes are
described along with an executive summary, current status, briefing slides and reading list on the Autonomous Authentica-
tion page.
Autokey authenticates individual packets using cookies bound to the IP source and destination addresses. The cookies must
have the same addresses at both the server and client. For this reason operation with network address translation schemes
is not possible. This reflects the intended robust security model where government and corporate NTP servers are operated
outside firewall perimeters.
There are three timeouts associated with the Autokey scheme. The key list timeout, which defaults to about 1.1 h, speci-
fies the interval between generating new key lists. The revoke timeout, which defaults to about 36 h, specifies the
interval between generating new private values. The restart timeout, with default about 5 d, specifies the interval
between protocol restarts to refresh public values. In general, the behavior when these timeouts expire is not affected
by the issues discussed on this page.
NTP SECURE GROUPS
NTP secure groups are used to define cryptographic compartments and security hierarchies. All hosts belonging to a secure
group have the same group name but different host names. The string specified in the host option of the crypto command is
the name of the host and the name used in the host key, sign key and certificate files. The string specified in the ident
option of the crypto command is the group name of all group hosts and the name used in the identity files. The file nam-
ing conventions are described on the ntp-keygen page.
Each group includes one or more trusted hosts (THs) operating at the root, or lowest stratum in the group. The group name
is used in the subject and issuer fields of the TH self-signed trusted certificate for these hosts. The host name is used
in the subject and issuer fields of the self-signed certificates for all other hosts.
All group hosts are configured to provide an unbroken path, called a certificate trail, from each host, possibly via
intermediate hosts and ending at a TH. When a host starts up, it recursively retrieves the certificates along the trail
in order to verify group membership and avoid masquerade and middleman attacks.
Secure groups can be configured as hierarchies where a TH of one group can be a client of one or more other groups oper-
ating at a lower stratum. A certificate trail consist of a chain of hosts starting at a client, leading through secondary
servers of progressively lower stratum and ending at a TH. In one scenario, groups RED and GREEN can be cryptographically
distinct, but both be clients of group BLUE operating at a lower stratum. In another scenario, group CYAN can be a client
of multiple groups YELLOW and MAGENTA, both operating at a lower stratum. There are many other scenarios, but all must be
configured to include only acyclic certificate trails.
IDENTITY SCHEMES AND CRYPTOTYPES
All configurations include a public/private host key pair and matching certificate. Absent an identity scheme, this is a
Trusted Certificate (TC) scheme. There are three identity schemes, IFF, GQ and MV described on the Identity Schemes page.
With these schemes all servers in the group have encrypted server identity keys, while clients have nonencrypted client
identity parameters. The client parameters can be obtained from a trusted agent (TA), usually one of the THs of the lower
stratum group. Further information on identity schemes is on the Autokey Identity Schemes page.
A specific combination of authentication and identity schemes is called a cryptotype, which applies to clients and
servers separately. A group can be configured using more than one cryptotype combination, although not all combinations
are interoperable. Note however that some cryptotype combinations may successfully intemperate with each other, but may
not represent good security practice. The server and client cryptotypes are defined by the the following codes.
NONE A client or server is type NONE if authentication is not available or not configured. Packets exchanged between
client and server have no MAC.
AUTH A client or server is type AUTH if the key option is specified with the server configuration command and the
client and server keys are compatible. Packets exchanged between clients and servers have a MAC.
PC A client or server is type PC if the autokey option is specified with the server configuration command and com-
patible host key and private certificate files are present. Packets exchanged between clients and servers have a
MAC.
TC A client or server is type TC if the autokey option is specified with the server configuration command and com-
patible host key and public certificate files are present. Packets exchanged between clients and servers have a
MAC.
IDENT A client or server is type IDENT if the autokey option is specified with the server configuration command and
compatible host key, public certificate and identity scheme files are present. Packets exchanged between clients
and servers have a MAC.
The compatible cryptotypes for clients and servers are listed in the following table.
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
| Client/Server | NONE | AUTH | PC | TC | IDENT |
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
| NONE | yes | yes* | yes* | yes* | yes* |
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
| AUTH | no | yes | no | no | no |
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
| PC | no | no | yes | no | no |
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
| TC | no | no | no | yes | yes |
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
| IDENT | no | no | no | no | yes |
+-------------------------+------------------+-------------------+------------------+------------------+----------------+
* These combinations are not valid if the restriction list includes the notrust option.
CONFIGURATION
Autokey has an intimidating number of configuration options, most of which are not necessary in typical scenarios. The
simplest scenario consists of a TH where the host name of the TH is also the name of the group. For the simplest identity
scheme TC, the TH generates host key and trusted certificate files using the ntp-keygen -T command, while the remaining
group hosts use the same command with no options to generate the host key and public certificate files. All hosts use the
crypto configuration command with no options. Configuration with passwords is described in the ntp-keygen page. All group
hosts are configured as an acyclic tree with root the TH.
When an identity scheme is included, for example IFF, the TH generates host key, trusted certificate and private server
identity key files using the ntp-keygen -T -I -i group command, where group is the group name. The remaining group hosts
use the same command as above. All hosts use the crypto ident group configuration command.
Hosts with no dependent clients can retrieve client parameter files from an archive or web page. The ntp-keygen can
export these data using the -e option. Hosts with dependent clients other than the TH must retrieve copies of the server
key files using secure means. The ntp-keygen can export these data using the -q option. In either case the data are
installed as a file and then renamed using the name given as the first line in the file, but without the filestamp.
EXAMPLES
Consider a scenario involving three secure groups RED, GREEN and BLUE. RED and BLUE are typical of national laboratories
providing certified time to the Internet at large. As shown ion the figure, RED TH mort and BLUE TH macabre run NTP sym-
metric mode with each other for monitoring or backup. For the purpose of illustration, assume both THs are primary
servers. GREEN is typical of a large university providing certified time to the campus community. GREEN TH howland is a
broadcast client of both RED and BLUE. BLUE uses the IFF scheme, while both RED and GREEN use the GQ scheme, but with
different keys. YELLOW is a client of GREEN and for purposes of illustration a TH for YELLOW.
The BLUE TH macabre uses configuration commands
crypto pw qqsv ident blue peer mort autokey broadcast address autokey
where qqsv is the password for macabre files and address is the broadcast address for the local LAN. It generates BLUE
files using the commands
ntp-keygen -p qqsv -T -G -i blue ntp-keygen -p qqsv -e >ntpkey_gqpar_blue
The first line generates the host, trusted certificate and private GQ server keys file. The second generates the public
GQ client parameters file, which can have any nonconflicting mnemonic name.
The RED TH mort uses configuration commands
crypto pw xxx ident red peer macabre autokey broadcast address autokey
where xxx is the password for mort files. It generates RED files using the commands
ntp-keygen -p xxx -T -I -i red ntp-keygen -p xxx -e >ntpkey_iffpar_red
The GREEN TH howland uses configuration commands
crypto pw yyy ident green broadcastclient
where yyy is the password for howland files. It generates GREEN files using the commands
ntp-keygen -p yyy -T -G -i green ntp-keygen -p yyy -e >ntpkey_gqpar_green ntp-keygen -p yyy -q zzz >zzz_ntp-
key_gqkey_green
The first two lines serve the same purpose as the preceding examples. The third line generates a copy of the private
GREEN server file for use on another server in the same group, say YELLOW, but encrypted with the zzz password.
A client of GREEN, for example YELLOW, uses the configuration commands
crypto pw abc ident green server howland autokey
where abc is the password for its files. It generates files using the command
ntp-keygen -p abc
The client retrieves the client file for that group from a public archive or web page using nonsecure means. In addition,
each server in a group retrieves the private server keys file from the TH of that group, but it is encrypted and so must
be sent using secure means. The files are installed in the keys directory with name taken from the first line in the
file, but without the filestamp.
Note that if servers of different groups, in this case RED and BLUE, share the same broadcast media, each server must
have client files for all groups other than its own, while each client must have client files for all groups. Note also
that this scenario is for illustration only and probably would not be wise for practical use, as if one of the TH refer-
ence clocks fails, the certificate trail becomes cyclic. In such cases the symmetric path between RED and BLUE, each in a
different group, would not be a good idea.
AUTHENTICATION COMMANDS
automax [logsec]
Specifies the interval between regenerations of the session key list used with the Autokey protocol, as a power
of 2 in seconds. Note that the size of the key list for each association depends on this interval and the current
poll interval. The default interval is 12 (about 1.1 h). For poll intervals above the specified interval, a ses-
sion key list with a single entry will be regenerated for every message sent.
controlkey keyid
Specifies the key ID to use with the ntpq utility, which uses the standard protocol defined in RFC-1305. The
keyid argument is the key ID for a trusted key, where the value can be in the range 1 to 65534, inclusive.
crypto [randfile file] [host name] [ident name] [pw password]
This command requires the OpenSSL library. It activates public key cryptography and loads the required host key
and public certificate. If one or more files are left unspecified, the default names are used as described below.
Unless the complete path and name of the file are specified, the location of a file is relative to the keys
directory specified in the keysdir configuration command or default /etc/ntp/crypto. Following are the options.
digest MD2 | MD4 | MD5 | MDC2 | RIPEMD160 | SHA | SHA1
Specify the message digest algorithm, with default MD5. If the OpenSSL library is installed, name can be
be any message digest algorithm supported by the library not exceeding 160 bits in length. However, all
Autokey participants in an Autokey subnet must use the same algorithm. Note that the Autokey message
digest algorithm is separate and distinct form the symmetric key message digest algorithms. Note: If com-
pliance with FIPS 140-2 is required, the algorithm must be ether SHA or SHA1.
host name
Specifies the string used when constructing the names for the host, sign and certificate files generated
by the ntp-keygen program with the -s name option.
ident name
Specifies the string used in constructing the identity files generated by the ntp-keygen program with the
-i name option.
pw password
Specifies the password to decrypt files previously encrypted by the ntp-keygen program with the -p
option.
randfile file
Specifies the location of the random seed file used by the OpenSSL library. The defaults are described on
the ntp-keygen page.
keys keyfile
Specifies the complete path to the MD5 key file containing the keys and key IDs used by ntpd, ntpq and ntpdc when
operating with symmetric key cryptography. This is the same operation as the -k command line option. Note that
the directory path for Autokey media is specified by the keysdir command.
keysdir pathK
This command specifies the default directory path for Autokey cryptographic keys, parameters and certificates.
The default is /etc/ntp/crypto. Note that the path for the symmetric keys file is specified by the keys command.
requestkey keyid
Specifies the key ID to use with the ntpdc utility program, which uses a proprietary protocol specific to this
implementation of ntpd. The keyid argument is a key ID for a trusted key, in the range 1 to 65534, inclusive.
revoke [logsec]
Specifies the interval between re-randomization of certain cryptographic values used by the Autokey scheme, as a
power of 2 in seconds. These values need to be updated frequently in order to deflect brute-force attacks on the
algorithms; however, updating some values is a relatively expensive operation. The default interval is 17 (about
36 h). For poll intervals above the specified interval, the values will be updated for every message sent.
trustedkey [keyid | (lowid ... highid)] [...]
Specifies the key ID(s) which are trusted for the purposes of authenticating peers with symmetric key cryptogra-
phy. Key IDs used to authenticate ntpq and ntpdc operations must be listed here and additionally be enabled with
controlkey and/or requestkey. The authentication procedure for time transfer require that both the local and
remote NTP servers employ the same key ID and secret for this purpose, although different keys IDs may be used
with different servers. Ranges of trusted key IDs may be specified: "trustedkey (1 ... 19) 1000 (100 ... 199)"
enables the lowest 120 key IDs which start with the digit 1. The spaces surrounding the ellipsis are required
when specifying a range.
ERROR CODES
Errors can occur due to mismatched configurations, unexpected protocol restarts, expired certificates and unfriendly peo-
ple. In most cases the protocol state machine recovers automatically by retransmission, timeout and restart, where neces-
sary. Some errors are due to mismatched keys, digest schemes or identity schemes and must be corrected by installing the
correct media and/or correcting the configuration file. One of the most common errors is expired certificates, which must
be regenerated and signed at least once per year using the ntp-keygen - generate public and private keys program.
The following error codes are reported via the NTP control and monitoring protocol trap mechanism and to the cryptostats
monitoring file if configured.
101 bad field format or length
The packet has invalid version, length or format.
102 bad timestamp
The packet timestamp is the same or older than the most recent received. This could be due to a replay or a
server clock time step.
103 bad filestamp
The packet filestamp is the same or older than the most recent received. This could be due to a replay or a key
file generation error.
104 bad or missing public key
The public key is missing, has incorrect format or is an unsupported type.
105 unsupported digest type
The server requires an unsupported digest/signature scheme.
106 unsupported identity type
The client or server has requested an identity scheme the other does not support.
107 bad signature length
The signature length does not match the current public key.
108 signature not verified
The message fails the signature check. It could be bogus or signed by a different private key.
109 certificate not verified
The certificate is invalid or signed with the wrong key.
110 host certificate expired
The old server certificate has expired.
111 bad or missing cookie
The cookie is missing, corrupted or bogus.
112 bad or missing leapseconds table
The leapseconds table is missing, corrupted or bogus.
113 bad or missing certificate
The certificate is missing, corrupted or bogus.
114 bad or missing group key
The identity key is missing, corrupt or bogus.
115 protocol error
The protocol state machine has wedged due to unexpected restart.
FILES
See the ntp-keygen page. Note that provisions to load leap second values from the NIST files have been removed. These
provisions are now available whether or not the OpenSSL library is available. However, the functions that can download
these values from servers remains available.
SEE ALSO
ntp.conf(5), ntpd(8)
HTML documentation in ntp-doc package.
This file was automatically generated from HTML source.
ntp_auth(5)
